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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of joint development projects by local government
and private investors. These projects have gained increased importance in recent
decades. An-important question this thesis addresses is why municipal governments
have begun to play en entrepreneurial role in development projects. The research
will also evaluate whether sharing the profits of municipally inspired development
is a legally valid objective of publicly subsidized downtown projects.
The entrepreneurial role of cities has, for several decades, been sanctioned by the
courts. The revitalization of commercial districts and other central city
communities has been legislatively defined as a public purpose since the advent of
urban reneval. Although the sharing of project profits is a legitimate expectation
of a city's participation in public-private partnerships, municipalities rarely
secure a direct share of the proceeds from joint development ventures.
This thesis will offer a legal rationale for the city's entrepreneurial role and will
illustrate, by example, how several cities have failed to achieve a share of project
profits. Downtown development in Yonkers, New York, Detroit, Michigan, and
Hartford, Connecticut are examined to understand the strerigths and failures of
municipal efforts to share the proceeds of development. This paper will prescribe a
remedy for altering and strengthening the city's hand in negotiating joint
development agreements and for securing a greater and more direct return on a
city's publicly subsidized projects. This thesis concludes that the failure of
municipalities to secure a share of project profits can be reversed by the
implementation of a national urban development policy that requires city officials
to recapture the value of public development subsidies.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Phillip L. Clay
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The entrepreneurial role of cities has been sanctioned y the courts fo r
several decades. The revitalization of commercial districts and other central city
communities has been legislatively defined as a public purpose since the advent of
urban reneval. Yet, although the sharing of project profits may be a legitimate
expectation of a city's participation in public-private partnerships, municipalities
have rarely secured a direct share of the proceeds from joint development
ventures.
The revitalization of downtown and the use of financial incentives for
development has become a valid public, municipal purpose. The influence of
historical restrictions against municipal involvement in entrepreneurial activities
has eroded over time as courts and legislatures have redefined the meaning of
public use and blurred the distinction between the widely accepted public role of
the city and the more highly scrutinized proprietary functions of a municipality.
That numerous courts have had difficulty delineating between the government's
rightful regulatory and proprietary capacities has allowed municipalities to expand
their entrepreneurial role.
As cities become involved in proprietary activities, they lose their
sovereign immunity and become subject to liability for preferential and
anticompetitive treatment of development which the city actively or indirectly
fosters. However, cities will not be found liable unless they engage in egregiously
Introduction Chapter One
nd patently col1u.sive tehavior. A municipality's entrepreneurial behavior reill De
udicially sanc tioned:
(1) so long as the CiTy has .a valid interest in participating in dowrntowv7n
development;
(2) anmd such municipal entrepreneuri activity is a clearly articulated
and effirmatively expresed state leg islative policy.
C:nsequently. Since the r:vitalisation iof diod ntown s ;a learl j rticul-ted state
policy.. a municipality may pursue revitalization by displac:in-ig competition.
participating in profits and by securing for itself an entrepreneurial role in
development.
Yet, despite judicial decisions vhich have unambiguously sanctioned an
entrepreneurial role for municipalities, cities have only timidly asssumed this
function. The failure of cities to secure for:themselves a share of project profits is
illustrated by several development projects in which the municipality participated
in highly touted "public-private partnerships." I will return to these eemple
throughout the thesis.
In the City of Yonkers in the early 1970's, the municipality sought to
encourage the expansion of an industrial facility by the Otis Elevator Company.
Yonkers condemned land and, at the request of Otis, sold the parcel for one-tenth its
cost to the city. Yonkers conveyed the land to Otis in exchange for a letter of intent
to retain facilities and jobs in the city. Then Otis took title to the land, Yonkers
released Otis of remaining obligations as a sign of good faith. Seven years later, Otis
left Yonkers amidst contentions by the city that the company was unjustly enriched
by the massive public expenditures used to entice the company to remain.
In the City of Detroit in the early part of this decade, the municipality
sought to facilitate the construction of a new industrial plant by General Motors.
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The city deivee the site reqt ed byer G.M. for development at one-twentieth the
cost to Detroit. Detroit contributed a maj or share of the equity and assumed much of
the risk for the project, described as "one of the most ambitious cooperative public
private urban development ventures ever undertaken."[1] However, five years
after the city gAreed to participate in the development of a new facility for F.M..
Detroit has yet to t:enefit from additional tax revenue or from the creation of
permanent jobs that were anticipated when Detroit entered into the agreement and
partnership.
In the City of Hartford during the last several years, the municpality has
entered into public-private partnership agreeements for the construction and
development of several downtown office buildings. In one instance, the city
exchanged a 20-year tax abatement for the prospective share of fifty percent of the
profits from office rentals, in accordance with a ground lease agreement. Early
projections estimated Hartford's annual project income to be as high as $1 million,
but those projections remain unfulfilled in the first few years of the project despite
a low vacancy rate during those early years of operation. Nevertheldss, the profit
sharing arrangements embodied in the ground lease secured by the city has been
used as a model for other partnership agreements in spite of the failure of such
agreements to achieve a share of profits for the City of Hartford.
The failure of city officials of Yonkers, Detroit and Hartford to secure a
more direct return on their public investment dollars need not discredit the city's
participation in those public-private partnerships. Municipal participation in
joint development ventures can be justified when the prospects for return include
secondary goals such as enhanced job opportunities, new tax revenues or a
revitalized commercial district. On the other hand, the failure of Yonkers, Detroit
Introduction
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Chapter One
and Hartford to secure a more immediate financial return may be explained t the
city's perception that it bargains from a position of rwealness. Although the
entrepreneuriel role of cities is j udicaily s.rntiond, municiplities may tbe
reluctant to demand a return on its investment because the city may fear it riskls
unacceptably high econoQ.cmicS loM to is emplo eti' an revenue tase if itfils to
be ;aquiescent in its negotiations.. or the city may have incorrec vtly con c luded that
it is legllvy constrained.
Only a national urban development policy such as that embodied by the
federal Urban Development Action Grant program can remedy the timidity of city
officials and empower them to secure a greater and more direct share of project
income from municipally fostered development. The UDAG program encourages
cities to recapture the value of public development subsidies and helps change
cities' perceptions about their role in the development process. During the early
years of the UDAG program, the proportion of UDAG projects containing provisions
for the recapture of public funds increased from 30% in 1978 to 62% in 1980. The
City of Syracuse offers one notable illustration of how UDAG funds can be used to
secure a direct share of project income. The hotel and conference center developed
by Syracuse University not only offers the prospect of new jobs and additional tax
revenues for Syracuse, but a direct share of the profits as a consequence of the
city's ownership of the first 29 units of the condominiun hotel.
This thesis will offer a legal rationale for the city's entrepreneurial role
and will illustrate, by example, how. several cities have failed to achieve a share of
project profits. This thesis also will prescribe a remedy for altering and
strengthening the city's hand in negotiating joint development agreements and for
securing a greater and more direct return on a city's publicly subsidized projects.
Introduction Chapter One
This thesis concl thae tT the failure of muricipBlities to -Secure -a Share of project
profits can te reversedl ty the implementation of a national urtan development
polic~y that require. city officias to recapture the velue of putlic development
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Chapter Twvo
LEGAL J.USTIF ICAT ION
FOR MUNICIPAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
A RATIONALE FOR PROFIT SHARING
Land use policy has traditionally been used to accelerate residential and
economic development. Throughout our nation's history, the federal government
has employed subsidies and incentives to foster settlement, expansion,
industrialization and development. Massive grants of land by European powers
fostered colonial settlement during the pre-revolutionary period. Homesteading
encouraged farming in underpopulated, rural regions during the latter part of the
1800's. Railroad grants fostered cross-continental growth in the 19th century.
Below-market rate leasing of land spurred oil and mineral exploration. And slum
clearance has been used as a mechanism for redeveloping and reindustrializing
declining metropolitan regions in the last thirty years.
Patterns of private land development in our nation's cities continue to
influence government land policies, even as federally subsidized urban renewal
programs dry up. The loss of federal aid to the cities has spurred municipalities to
seek more creative solutions and assume greater responsibility for initiating
economic development. Public subsidies and tax incentives comprise vital elements
of many development projects, but limited public dollars have accentuated a need to
leverage scarce government subsidies against maximum private investment. Efforts
by municipalities to maximize the financial return on their investment is
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characteristic of the city's new entreprenei-urial role.
The roles of both cities and developers have evolved in the post-urban
rene-va period to encompass. a wider range of shared costs and responsibilities.
Municipalities, for many years, have borne a share of the development costs. in
order to stimulate private investment found lacking in the nation's citie. During
urtbz rene tal. cities assumed the lead in development by esemlinglnd ercws..
relocating current residents and clearing sites for eventual disposition to
developers. Site improvements, such as the construction of access roads, pedestrian
malls or public spaces, were commonly provided by the locality. In recent years.,
municipalities have employed more direct financial assistance such as loan
commitments, financial subsidies or the below-market disposition of land to
stimulate and control downtown development.
As municipalities have assumed an increasingly entrepreneurial role in
the development process, several changes have resulted. Cities have assumed a
greater share of the costs and risks associated with urban development than in the
past and have greatly expanded their role in the decision-making and project
planning process. Most important, cities have developed the potential to share the
earnings of publicly-subsidized developmenot. This new relationship between city
and developer, known as a "public-private partnership," characterizes the
mechanism for current downtown development efforts. [1] Municipalities have
assumed the role of partner in development by asssuming a greater share of the
costs and risks associated with urban development; they have provided more direct
financial assistance and have expanded their role in the decision-making and
project planning process.
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The remainder tof this chapter explains 71'hy the iourts, spe;ially in The
last thirty years.. have expansively characterized municipal participatio in
do-1ntow7n development as a valid public purpose dIespite consttutial restraints
which prohibit government Subsidization of private enterprise. Courts have
diiihdthe ditntosbten rdto3.acptbepbi uci n n
more innovative p1op7rietar activity. AS a consquence.. the potential for
municipalities to shere the earnings of publicly subsidized development has
evolved as an outgrowth of the public's favorable view towards the city's
entrepreneurial role, as evidenced by the ultimate sanctioning of such behavior by
the courts and state legislatures.
Historical restrictions against municipal involvement remain in effect,
but their influence has eroded over time as courts and legislatures have redefined
the meanings of public use and purpose. [21 Most state constitutions contain one or
more limitations of public assistance to private enterprise. (31 Among the
constitutional restraints are debt limitations, electorate approval of borrowing, and
prohibitions against state aid to private enterprise. Many constitutions have
forbidden the use of the credit of a state in any manner to aid any individual,
association or corporation. These restrictions were direct responses to common
methods of providing financial assistance to railroads in the nineteenth century.
[41
In the twentieth century, the past three decades in particular have
witnessed the courts' expansion of the municipalities' role in its economic
revitalization. Public subsidies and investments have been justified by the cOurts
because of their acceptance of downtown development as a public good. [51 The
C~hapfte-r TwotLeal Justificatiorn
putlic purpose doctrine has teen redefined and expanded to encompass not only
the condemnation of blighted areas of the city, but to justify the use of public
indtTrial fin.ncing; .a. swell. [6] Although the public purpose doctrine is
recognized s a limitation on public entrepreneuerial activity the courts have
broadyinterp.reted that doctrine so as to make it "responsive to the forces of
c.anein a dynamic oiet." 7
The parameters of acceptatle "public use" have never been subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. This vas true during the pre-industrial era when the
emergence of major American corporations vielding massive amounts of capital
raised fears that "a legislative conception of public advantage might lead it to
authorize wholesale expropriation of farms and homes." [81 In 1860, for instance,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the taking of land under the
mere assertion of public benefit has a presumption of validity. The court ruled that
it was enough if the taking
ten ds to eniarge the reorcs increase thefindustria1 eergies and promote the produive power
of any c onsiderable number of the inhtabitents of a
section of the State. or leads to the growth of townw.
and the creation of new sources for the employment
of priTvate capita and labor. indirectir contributes to
the generali welfare and to the proserit y of the whole
c;OMMUnity. [9 1
Consequently, even during the industrial age, courts gave the legislature much
deference and discretion in formulating a notion of public use.
Public use and public benefit are even more broadly interpreted today,
and scant evidence of judicial scrutiny exists to determine whether a particular
taking meets the public use requirmement. The recent use of eminent domain to
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support industrial development in the Poletown community of Detroit offers one
such example. [101 Here the taking was deemed valid even though the condemned
land e-subsequently convved to a private corporation. [11] The Michigen
Supreme Court. in a highly controversial ruling, held that stimulating economic
development and generatintg jot opportunties i n the city ert vali bectie thSat
tin t h e lei Jslatiza v 1e dn1iti o n o f pul.ic ppo . 12]
Although numerous commentators have characterized the Poletown
decision as an exceptional expansion of the public use doctrine.. [13 the decision
may be characterized as a logical expansion of that doctrine espoused by the United
States Supreme Court in 1954. At that time, the use of eminent domain had become a
vital element of current urban renewal programs because of the Housing Act of
1949. In ruling on the legitimacy of condemnation in slum clearance efforts, the
Supreme Court held that land may be taken by eminent domain and subsequently
disposed of by sale or lease to private enterprise for redevelopment in accordance
with a reneval plan. [14] The court's decision in Berman v. Parker acknovledged
that public use may be broadly defined by the legislature, and that the judiciary had
a limited role in determining whether the eminent domain power was exercised for
a public purpose. Prior to Berman some states already characterized the clearance
of slums as a public purpose. [15] Even condemnation of a vacant undeveloped lot
has been justified as a valid public purpose because such land could conceivably
become a slum. [161
On only rare occasions has the public use doctrine been restricted, and
then only as a consequence of legislatively imposed limitations.The existence of
statutory restrictions for determining what is a public use for purposes of assisting
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development is often determinative in a court's ss 'essment of the validity of the
public act. [171 The one major requirement of the putlic use doctrine is that
statutory authorization prescribe legislative otjectives from which public use or
benefit may be derived. This requirement helps the court determine whether the
tl: is for a v4lid publiic use. When the express purpose of land condemnation is
to stimulate economic development,. courts have invaidatsuh tai jng. i n t
atsence of statutory lenguage defining such purposes as a public use. [18] The
determination of pi4blic use is a legislative question. The absence of statutory
authorization to condemn land for the purpose of revitalizing downtown was
apparently the determinative factor for the court in ruling the condemnation not
to be a public use.
The dichotomy between public and private or between proprietary and
regulatory activities of local government has become increasingly blurred,
particularly as the public purpose doctrine has been expanded. McQuillan, the noted
authority on municipal law, has commented on how distinctions between the public
and private role of local government have become blurred.
A municp-al corporaion is a public institution
created to promote public. as i gshed from
private. objects. . . The modern trend of
the decisions is to extend the class of publk
uses or purpoes in considering the municipai
activities sought to be included therein. The fat
that other purposes will also be served does not
inTalidte the exercise of a power conferred on
a municipa1itv even if such other purpoes alone
oultd not haTe jsiied the exercise of
pocr'er. [19.]
Similarly, a recent United States Supreme Court decision commented on the
difficulty in distinguishing between public and proprietary activities. In an action
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challenging Congressionel regulatory au;thoIrity over the states and their
sutdivisiorns when engaged in non-t'raditional governmental functions, the
Supreme Court noTed:1
T4.e essenc ezof our feduerad xssteom is7b tha woIthn
the realm of authority qer? ipen to hem under
to enag in. any ac11T'ity that their ctsnchoose ~ ~ ~~ ti 6D jthe comn w . o m Tte o
nthodfox or' unneess an ne
ele-- inldn the' judiciar - - dem tt
in TolTemenlt to be. Any rue of stte immunitTr
that iOO4(s~' to the ' "itiona " "in tegra - or
"necesary" nat±ure of governmetal~ functions
inevitablyi invT-es 8an unelectedf eerajuicar
to make decisions about hich state policiex it
fTavorsq and which ones it disl.ikYes. "The science
of goTetnment . . . is the scieet2c of experiment. "
[citation omitted/ and the States Ca1nnot serVe as
laboratories for rocijal and economic; experiment
kitation omitted/ if they Must Pay an added price
iTb en they meet the changing needs of their citixenry
by takin. Up utions that en earlier day. an2d 6
different societ y /eft in private han dS. [201
Changes in the historical functions of states have resulted in a number of
once-private f'unctions being assumed by states and localities. The provision of a
water supply, the operation of mass transit, the administration of education, and
even the maintenance of parks for recreation are all appropriate examples of this
trend. The Supreme Court said that the attempt to draw boundaries for state
regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is not only
unworkable, but is inconsistent with established principles of federalism.
That numerous 'courts have had difficulty delineating between the
government's rightful regulatory and proprietary capacities, has allowed
municipalities to expand their entrepreneurial roles. The entrepreneurial role of
municipalities is becoming a more widely accepted function of government. Since
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e ureme Court's approval of urban reneal efforts in 1954, [21] the
participation by municipalities in development partnerships -ad the s- of
finnial inCentives for' d:evelopment have received judicial sanction tbecause such
activity serves a valid public purpose in revitalization of dowrntown. Moreover..
loc"a. l go,'vernmentswho attemtp't to lure industry and econmic activity a:ct in direct
competition writh neighborn localities w-ho also offer financial incentives. an-d
other inducements to developers. [22]
The assistance offered by municipalities to private developers has been
sanctioned by the courts. [23] In the last three decades, the judiciary has
continually broadened the realm of municipal behavior that is permitted in the
pursuit of a city's revitalization. Cities have been participating in more innovative
forms of public-private partnerships as a consequence of the legislative and
judicial characterization of downtow%-n revitalization as a public purpose. However..
when municipalities engage in municipal entrepreneurial activities, they become
subject to liability for engaging in regulatory behavior which has the effect of
restraining competition among developers. Nevertheless, as the ensuing discussion
demonstrates, the obstacles to pursuit of a municipal antitrust claim make the
prospect of municipal liability unlikely.
The municipality's role as regulator may be compromised by its
participation in land development. One commentator has suggested that when
government serves as land developer, it acts no differently than private
profit-making firms.
weiwrheoen Ian d dev:.elopers and a 'rs
neigborhod dfendrs. f gvrmns wr
Legal Justification Chapter Tw-o
als lad eveoprx in ter on ri ght
IottOever they ou!d Jte Ite le toa 1;om P rami-.se
their role a environmenta, reguat r.
Consequently.. when a city becomes involved. with private enterprise in
entrepreneurie s:tivities. the municieli.ty t:becomes subiect to different ad
of Dehavior. Chief .Justice Marshaeil.. in e.n early Supreme Court decision sTted that
hen acgovernment entiTy becomes i in a commerci venture:
/1. diTests itself . . . fC tse svereign
charcte.iand takes that L' a prite~ citiLren....
/1. descnds'to s level irth those wthb whom it
asocats tell. and~ tae h caat rve .hic
beolongs,- to its &roiae. and to 1.he business
ich% is to be rasce.[ 25 1
As municipalities become more involved in proprietary activities, they lose their
soveriegn immunity .and become subject to liability they may not normally be
exposed to. Preferential treatment of development projects may subject a
municipality to claims of anticompetitive behavior and make it vulnerable to
antitrust liability.
The municipality's use of regulatory powers to deny approval of certain
development projects has been the basis of several suits challenging a city's
development restrictions as an anticompetitive restraint of trade. [261 However,
with the notable exception of one case in Richmond, Virginia,[27 ] no developer has
ever successfully challenged a municipality on the grounds that it restricted
development and illegally restrained competition. Unless a municipality engages in
egregiously and patently anticompetitive or collusive behavior, it will not likely be
subject to antitrust liability.
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In Richmond. Virginia, the city w&s sued for anticompetitive :beheior
by a developer who wished to build a Hilton Hotel in the city. The developer claimed
entitrust dages of $250 million. [281 The plaintiffs in the actiori claimed that the
City attempted to deny their proposal for development in order to prevent a
competitive threat to the city's ownfL downtortn develoment pl-o.. and by so ating
had cnZpired to restrain the hotel trade in Richmond and attempted to monopize
it. Richmond city of1fiials attempted to theart construction of the Hilton because it
was "a threat to the viability of (the city's ] own program for the rejuvenation of
downtown Richmond."(29]
The City of Richmond had established a redevelopment plan which
sought to: (1) broaden the city's convention serving potential through development
of a new hotel/convention center; and (2) strengthen the tax base of the city
through new develoment in the project area. [30] The City, which had already
committed $17 million for construction of a municipal convention center and other
public improvements, argued:
(1) that only a hotel located within the downtown development district
could adequately serve the proposed convention center;
(2) that without the success of the downtown development project,
continued erosion of the downtown core could be expected; and
(3) that without the downtown redevelopment project, there would be no
economic impetus to development in other parts of the City of
Richmond. [311
Richmond's proposed hotel was to be developed by private interests with the
encouragement of the city, but without any direct financial investment by the city.
The city contended that commencement of the Hilton Hotei vould threaten the
viability ot its own downtown redevelopment project which had not yet located a
private developer for the hotel.
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To protect .geinst development of the Hilton Hotel, the City enacted en
ordinance amending the zoning regulations. The zoning amendment imposed upon
developers the additionel requirement that any proposed project be consistent with
the objectives of the downtown redevelopment plan.. s well es Richmond's master
i On the basis of this ne71 zoning ordinen-ice, 7 city officl denied te P Hi
petit ion for developrent approvel because of concent' atout the economic viability
.Richmond's downtown plan. The proposed Hilton .Hdapproved only Two
weeks after the zoning amendment wes passed. The City of Richmond ultimately
settled out of court for $2 million plus attorney's fees,[32] despite the existence of
several legal precedents that suggest that Richmond may have had a strong
defense.
In the Richmond case, zoning was used to protect the viability of the
ity's downtown redevelopment plan. The salvaging of Richmond's downtown
economy required a hotel, and such a hotel could not succeed unless the city
prevented the construction of any competing hotel outside the development area.
[33] Several recent federal cases support the propositon that regulatory action of
the type taken in Richmond may validly benefit one competitor at the expense of
another. [34] A municipality does not engage in an unlawful restraint of trade by
rejecting a project that is contrary to the public's interest in downtown
redevelopment.
A municipality's use of its regulatory powers to limit development may
also be justified by the state action doctrine. [351 In order for anticompetitive
conduct to gain protection under the state action doctrine, one of three conditions
must be met:
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(.1) the state mL.'Ist havre a valid interest in displacing. competition
through re-gulation; (36) or(2) the state's policy to displae competition must be clearly articulated
and effirmaively expressed; (317] or
(3) the protected activity must be actively supervised b y the state. [38
The displacement of competition is authorized by the State legislatures and is
supported by the federal courts. [391 In each instance, the court held that
rdevelopmient of substenderd and blighted ere's s thorized by the legi;lture
and immunized the city from antitrust liability. The prohibition of commercial
development that conflicted with the city's redevelopment plan was proper because
state urban development laws were clearly articulated state policies which
authorized the displacement of competition. Zoning is therefore a proper
mechanism for revitalizing depressed areas of the city.
Local laws and zoning ordinances, in particular, inevitably displace
competition. Antitrust laws which are intended to promote competition inevitably
collide with those state and local laws that have a tendency to to displace
competition. [40]
GoTertnmet has adtinally stepped in where the
priate sector a'&s un. Wrling or urale to sUpply
needed serTices Or here erv~ices which became
essential .'ere abused and misused by privae
etpri.se for its own profi to the detriment of the
pzuic; generally. [41]
Consequently, local government policy may even be antithetical to antitrust theory.
Other potential antitrust problems have not yet been resolved t'y the
courts. The granting of tax abatements or the use of industrial revenue bonds has
not been considered in any antitrust case, but municipal liability for such action is
deemed unlikely.
/Ii would seem that a city ii'ould in genera b'e asfree from antitrust problems in c-hoosing whom to
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exampie. -srn inio nai efort in cowperation wit'11
one~~~ cometto *,rt dirc prrpose of dsryn
ant~rher. A42v'
Another area of concern may be the matter of fee arrangements tet.ween
municipality and developers.
cha gecab:le J i. V'. companies .a franchising~ fe f2
.5 pe.rcet of thPeene ro hs f-ees ma5ke
Is th&e cit e h t partnr in -a buiness
rventure. .rh o h nirust !is~ appt'LyTI
here?(' 431
Unresolved then is the question as to whether the municipality's collection of a
percentage of a development project's rents is a proprietary activity that subjects
the city to antitrust liability.
Yet, even if a municipeiity's perticipation in putiic-private
partnerships does subject the city to antitrust liability, such behavior would not
conclusively be deemed unreasonable. (44] Courts would likely apply a "rule of
reason" analysis to consider the validity of the municipality's behavior and would
consider the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable, the history of
the restraint and the purpose or end sought to be attained. [451 Since a
municipality's entrepreneurial activity is not motivated by mere profit alone, the
public purpose of the municipal activity would justify any anticompetitive effects.
It is, thus, highly likely that municipalities charged with anticompetitive behavior
would survive scrutiny by the Court.
To protect itself against antitrust liability, the municipality can
document its land use decisions to prevent claims of collusion. Perhaps the wisest
course for municipalities to protect itself against possible liability is to be certain
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that all land use decisions which are the basis of joint development ventures are
made openly. in strict compliance with fair procedural standards.. in recognition of
conflicts of interest and with a detailed dis'closure of anyvlr economic or public
interest considerations upon which they are based. [461 Municipalities' fear of
liabilitya exlain. I; hyd some cjjitie have not adeqatel prte :thei g end
fiancial interests when negotiating development -greements. One nationa;ly
k:nown municipal defense counsel sugests that munic(ipalities are approving many
more projects then they normally would to avoid any appearance of improprieties.
[471
Nonetheless, the difficulties in pursuing an antitrust action against
a municipality are numerous and onerous. A city's use of its regulatory powers to
restrict development mill receive judicial protection as a state sanctioned activity.
Courts are likely to immunize many municipal development activities from antitrust
liability, even when the effect of a city's regulation is to block projects that
compete with their own. furthermore, proof of conspiracy between a municipality
and a developer is almost impossible to prove because an inference of collusive
behavior cannot be drawn by evidence of a developer's support for subsequently
enacted zoning changes. [48]
Courts have unambiguosusly sanctioned an entrepreneurial role for
municipalities. The revitalization of downtown and the use of financial incentives
for development is a valid public purpose and is within the realm of acceptable
municipal behavior. Unless cities engage in patently collusive behavior,
municipalities would not become subject to liability for the preferential or
anticompetitive treatment of development which the city fosters. The participation
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by a municipality in proprietary activities is j udicially sanctioned: (1) so long as the
city has a valid interest in participating in downtown development; arnd, (2) such
municipal activity is a clerly articulated state legislative policy. Because the
revitalization of do'wntown is a valid public purpose and a clearly articulated state
-policyi ia mui ipality-5;-nj ma ursu~e ritls tion bydisplacing competition and.
ultimately. ty hering in the profits of downtown development as eli.
Despite the clearly sanctioned entrepreneurial role of municipalities.
cities have only timidly assumed this entrepreneurial function. Perhaps municipal
officials are reluctant to assume the more aggressive role of profit earner because
of their misperception that the capacity to earn profits is an invalid or questionable
governmental activity. One can speculate that municipal officials, unlike the
courts, more cynically question the validity of innovative, proprietary activities.
The perception of municipal officials that they are legally constrained from
sharing the profits of publicly subsidized development may be the biggest
stumbling block to the effective recapture of development subsidies . This may be a
rationale for the timid negotiating stance of some municipal officials.
The failure of cities to secure for themselves a share of project profits
may be illustrated by several highly touted public-private partnerships. The
following chapter will describe the development experiences in the cities of
Yonkers, Detroit and Hartford.
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Chapter Three
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSH IPS:
ILLUSTRATIONS OF FAILED ATTEMPTS
AT PROFIT SHARING
In addition to the legal rationale, municipal involvement in downacitown
development is justified on several economic grounds. First of ell, local government
is financially capable of combatting the shortcomings of the capital market which
tends to be averse to risk eand geared towards short term return. Government can
more effectively pool the risks of projects that it participates in since the
likelihood of failure is far greater for an individual private investor. Government
has stability because of its size; therefore, its investment decisions can be more
rational and foresighted. Municipal aid to private investors lovers the ris
inherent in land development and makes downtown development a more attractive
investment opportunity.
To encourage downtown development, cities have used several
mechanisms to lover the risks of developers. In the last several decades,
municipalities have used its resources to elicit and leverage private downtown
investment. The use of tax increment financing., the abatement or exemption of
taxes, the provision of direct loans and even the use of *ground leases all lover the
developer's up-front risk and encourage their participation in downtown
development.
Cities have employed financial inducements to stimulate or maintain
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industrial development. Ho .ever.. the ec:riomic benefits secured for those cities and
their residents may prove tenuous, at test. Yonkers and Detroit offer useftl
illus.tration of cities which have contritbuted significent aid for development
projects they were anxious to attain without securing binding commitments for a
return on their public expenditures.
Cities also have hist'oriclly UostereC deCmnt. by educig or
sta:bilizing taxes.. or with more traditional incentives such as grants.. site assemt'y
(with write-down of costs), utility and street improvements, or public financing of
garages. More recently, cities have tecome involved in the leasing of both land
and buildings, making loan commitments, and sharing operating and capital costs.
Subsidies provided by municipalities have served to spread the risks of development
among both public and private participants by lowering the equity required of
developers. Thus, the partnerships of today are often characterized as joint
development activities in which both partners share more fully in the. costs and
risks associated with economic development.
The projects in Yonkers, Detroit and Hartford are described in this
chapter because of the high visibility of joint development ventures in those three
cities. In Yonkers, New York. city officials have been greatly disappointed over
their participation in the expansion of an industrial facility for the Otis Elevator
Company. Recently, Yonkers brought their claims against Otis to federal court. In
Detroit, Michigan, the city contributed a major share of the equity in an industrial
project which is one of the most ambitious public-private urban development
ventures ever undertaken. There, too, the city may have failed to secure a minimal
return on its massive public expenditures. Finally, in Hartford, Connecticut.. the
municipality has been participating in several highly regarded partnerships with
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private developers. Yet.. despite the city's unusuel opportunity to share in project
profits, Hrtfiord has yet to procure any fl( income from its development efforts.
Among the most heralded public-prite partnerships are those in the City of
Hartford where the municipality has leased land and provided an abatement of txes
for the construction of office buildings ty regional developrs. Yzt, eerly
uies5tic projections of prjct profits remi flfilled. T'r4 ord offers
another illustration of a city that fied to successfully pursue its entrepreneuriel
function.
(a) The City of Yonkers
In Yonkers, New York., during the early 1970's, Otis Elevator Company.
the city's largest employer, urged the city to assist the company in securing land
needed for the expansion of the indwstrial facility. The company threatened to
leave Yonkers if it could not expand its facility to land adjacent to the Otis plant.
Faced with the prospect of a loss of several hundred jobs integral to the city's
economy, Yonkers condemned the property under the state sanctioned powers of
urban renewal. The condemnation withstood court challenges despite the fact that:
(1) the city openly signed an agreement with Otis before taking the property; and
(2) Otis openly expressed a desire to acquire the land to assure its own economic
viability in Yonkers. [11 In 1972, the City of Yonkers sold nine acres of land to Otis to
facilitate construction of a new plant. The parcel was sold for a mere one tenth its
cost to the city. Otis accepted the land for expansion of, its existing plant in
exchange for a written promise to the city to boost local employment. At public
hearings, local company officials projected the creation of up to 600 new jobs. Otis
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signed a letter of intent to retain facilities and jobs in Yonkers. However.. Wshen Otis
took title to the land two:' yeears later, Yonkers released the company of any
remainingobigjatioins. of this letter s. a sign of goodrfath.[2]
In the years follorwing Otis' construction of the new7 manufac:turing
facility. orders for Iearless machines plunged t v n less than four years.. an
Cmpiflment stea~dily d~e~cined. C y 19B' 3. only 350 'workers (down from a high of 140
in 1977) remained at the plant. Otis subsequently consolidated its operations at the
request of its parent company, United Technologies of Hartford. Connecticut, and
Otis finally left the City of Yonkers. The city is now suing Otis contending that the
company was unjustly enriched by the massive public expenditures used to entice
the company to remain.[3]
Yonkers claims that Otis failed to give the city a "reasonable" time to
recover the investment and expenses made on behalf of the elevator company. It is
seeking $16 million from Otis for the cost of acquiring and preparing the land a
decade earlier. While Otis claims no promises were made, the city asserts the
existence of an implied contract. No formal binding commitment between the
parties exists and the dispute is now before a federal district judge in New York. (4]
(b) The City of Detroit
A similar course of events transpired in Detroit, Michigan. There, too,
one of the city's largest industrial employers, General Motors, threatened to leave
the city, along with 3,800 jobs (amounting 'to one third of Detroit's manufacturing
jobs) if a suitable location' for G.M. was not found. G.M. -offered to build a new
industrial plant to replace two outmoded facilities, and preserve several thousand
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tryv job-s in the process. The company told Detroit officials that in light of its
special requirements.. only one feasible location existed in the city for its plant:
moreover, it threatened to leave Detroit if it could not have this site. If the city
succeeded in delivering the site, G.M. offered the prospect of retaining and creating
;as many as 8.000 permanent Jobs generting a projected $42 million in new7
nusineSs cti vit and nr n Dr' tax base tb 4.5 . The .ity
concluded that failure to produ:e the site would result in "unacceptably high"
economic losses to the industrial employment and revenue base of Detroit. f5]
Extensive residential and commercial condemnations were necessary to
prepare the 465-acre site for development by G.M. The City of Detroit spent $200
million to condemn and acquire 1200 parcels of land, relocate 3800 residents. and
clear the site for disposition to G.M. This lend was subsequently conveyed to G.M. at
one twentieth of the -cost to the city. Detroit assumed an enormous financial burden
in a project that was described as "one of the most dramatic and ambitous
cooperative public-private urban development ventures ever undertaken." [61 The
development of the G.M. facility in Detroit .makes use of a federal subsidy of $30
million, which at the time of the award had been the largest Urban Development
Action Grant ever awarded a single development project. Furthermore, the City of
Detroit provided G.M. with a twelve-year 50% tax abatement. As a consequence, the
prospect of projected tax gain is even further delayed. The city, by its disposition
of the site, provided a major share of the equity and assumed much of the risk for
the project. However, more than three years after the projected starting date of the
plant's operation, the G.M. facility has not yet begun production.[7 I
five years have passed since the City of Detroit offered to particpate in,
and expedite the development of, a new facility for G.M. Although nearly 30% of
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the capita: needed for development of the G.M. facility as provided tby Detroit, the
city has not yet tbenefitted from the aditionled tax revenue, nor from the creation of
permanent jotbs it nticpated w'hen it entered into this agremn an partnership.
[81 In addlition.. the City of Detroit does not have legal. recourse against G1.M.
Althoug:h the disposition of -Lend~ to G.M. tculd be characterized as n investment of
eq.it in the projec.t.. the City of Detroit m;ade no provision to eventuall 5here in
the proceeds of the plant. Nor has the city required the pay-back of loans or the
reimbursement of lend acquisition costs. As in Yonkers, the city failed to secure any
formally binding commitments from the company.
G.M., in its defense, may assert that the failure to complete construction
as scheduled illustrates the risks and uncertainties which accompany any major
development project. [91 And, as was claimed by the Otis Elevator Company, the
failure to begin production at the plant may be attributed to "market conditions"
which the company is powerless to control. [101 However, these claims do not justify
the failure of a publicly-subsidized company to maintain its commitments since
contractual agreements may alvays be conditioned on market fluctuations, such as
level of sales or rate of inflation.
The experiences of Yonkers and Detroit illustrate the importance to the
city of obtaining a minimum financial return. In Yonkers and Detroit, the city
could have maintained a reversionary interest in the property conveyed.
respectively, to Otis and G.M. Ownership of the property could revert to the
municipality if the subsidized company were to abandon the city. Alternatively, the
city could specify in its agreement with the developer that it share the proceeds
from the sale of land or the industrial plant. Several reasons justify a
municipality's efforts to share in the benefits of development it helps facilitate.
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Shering the proceeds of development eenr±ecapture the public subsidy easing the
government's ultimate financial burden. The recapture of public investment Cn
also increase future communitv benefits which result from such
projects.[11]
c)The City o f *H arTford
The City of Hartford provides a context within which to examine the
efficac:y of profit-sharing mechanisms which were explicitly incorporated into
public-private partnership agreements for the development of downtown office
buildings. In Hartford, during the last few years, city officials entered into formal
aereements which allow for the sharing of profits with the developer. What
follows is a brief description of Hartford's experience to spur downtown
development, and an assessment of the lessons to be learned from those efforts.
In the 1970's, David Chase of Chase Enterprises, a major Hartford
developer, made a proposal to city officials for the development of an office
building in downtown Hartford, an area that had not seen any major office
construction in nearly a decade. In exchange for land leased from the city, and in
consideration of a tax abatement that would run for 20 years, Chase offered to
construct a *385,000 square foot office tower and gave the city the potential to share
in the building's profits. Chase's reputation as a developer in Hartford wa;-s.
established in the mid-1970's when he invigorated the Hartford office mar1ket with
the construction of Financial Plaza and earned for Chase a reputation as a risk
taker. "The marketplace determines how Well any of us do," said Chase. Developers
can afford things like [sharing in profits] under the right circumstances and to a
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limited degree." [12]
The tax atatement for the new toffice tuilding appealed to Chase tecause
it signified that the city would share his risk in undertaking a $30 million project
The prospect of profit participation appealed to the city because it meant that
THerrd 7s to receive 5%! of the net cash flow for the project. [13
The techni:;ue used in Hartford to increase putlic sector reverds is
-aled a percentage-rent ground lease agreement. [14 City-owned lend is leased in
exchan-ge for a percentage of the project's income and the payment of rents in-lieu
of taxes. A long term ground lease permits the municipality to share in the income
of a project while expending the leverage of developers. A properly structured
ground lease can decrease the developer's equity investment by eliminating the
purchase price of land or the developer's exposure to risk. The ground lease is
usually subordinated, i.e... the city executes a mortgage of its land as security for the
development loan made to the lessee. For the developer, such long term leases can
greatly improve the net return on investment through improved financing terms,
reductions in equity outlays and tax advantages. As a result, the developer's
leverage is increased at little cost to the city. [151 The lease agreement would
require a minimum base payment plus a percentage of income generated by the
project. If the project does well, the city shares in the income and vill recover some
or all of its costs. Lease agreements may require in-lieu of tax payments to the city
based on per square footage of building space. These payments provide tax
certainty to developers and assures them that tax increases will come only after
designated time periods and in predetermined amounts.
Chase, the developer of the building known as Corporate Center, or the
"Stilts" Building, projected that the city's share of office rentals during the first
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year of The tuilding's operation would be $1 million. substantially more than the
tax bill for the property prior to development (which was then $654..500
annually).[171 The Hartford Courant attributed one source close to the project
-uggestin that the figure could run as high as $1.5 million. Chase, who was the
only d'eveloper in Hartford to ag:ree to share profits in exchage ftor tax cuts.
confirmed in 1981 tht the city would receve profits of $3 per square foot soon
the $1.70 per square foot rate normally assessed under the standerd tax formula. [181
In 1981.. during the first year of the project, rents for the Stilts Building were
projected at $20-$22 per square foot, twice the level that had been anticipated when
the lease was signed several years earlier. At the time, Chase said he would stand by
the agreement and not ask the city to renegotiate the profit sharing formula. [19]
However., more recently, the general counsel for Chase revealed that the developer
wes so concerned over the extent of rental income that might be owed the city that
Chase was "seriously considering buying out of the agreement" in order to paj the
lower, standard amount of taxes. [20]
Negotiations for the tax abatement and lease for the Stilts building had
been characterized by overly optimistic projections of earnings. Chase had
suggested to municipal officials that the City of Hartford would receive a minimum
of $340,000 during each of the first five years of the building's operation. None of
these projections have materialized. During the third year of the building's
operation, the financial statement submitted by the developer revealed an
operating deficiency of nearly $600..000 despite vracancies of perhaps no more than
5%. [211 Four years into the project's operation, the city has yet to share any
"profits" from the property. Had the property not been subject to a tax abatement,
the City of Hartford would have received $1 million in taxes for the current year.
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[22) The discrepancy between projected and actual earnings is explained bv the
developer as a consequence of competitive development forcing rental rates down.
Thus, the projections made in 181 vere overly optimistic. In only "a matter of
time," the city will be sharing in the profits, claims the developer. [23 However.
unieS.S the tuilding is tefinanced or sold in the near future. the verdict on the
of the agreement vill not be known ort yers.
The lease for the Stilts Building contained the followin: provisions for
payment of minimum rental and in-lieu of tax payments. During the first four
years of the building 's operation, the minimum in-lieu of tax payment ranged from
a low of $10,000 to a. high of $160,000 after 15 years. The lease required a minimum
base rental of $75,000 per year, plus $5,000 in back rent accrued during
construction, plus 10% of the net cash flow. As additional payments in lieu of taxes,
the city was owed 40% of the net cash flow: at least $10,000 during the first four
years, and a, minimum of $160,000 during the last five years of the 20-year tax
agreement. In addition, 50% of the profits from any resale or refinancing would
accrue to the city, offering the greatest potential yield to the city.
Chase explained that the discrepancy between projected and actual
earnings vas based on changed market conditions. "At different times, we thought
[the city] vould be sharing much earlier, but the market changed." [24] For the last
three years, the financial figures for the project were similar and the developer
insisted that there was no dispute with the city. "The auditing firm for the city has
never disagreed with us about how we approach the cash flow formula. "The
auditing firm for the city signed off on everything and said everything we were
doing was fine," said Chase. [25]
Indeed, Chase has operated well within its legal rights and has complied
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'Vith a11 technical reporting requirements. Nevertheless.. myan city officials are
disappointed and frustrated over the city's financial returns because the Ilesing
arrangement should have been "an absolute bonanza" for Hartford. ['261 The
leasing errangement for the Stilts Building did not meet the expectations -f the City.
according to '"oodrotw vilson aitor. the city manager for Hartford during
negotiations fo' the project. Geitor felt the a frd o  contracts for the p'roject
"somewhat political. The land, he explained, was held by one of the members of the
city council, and Chase was the only one to bid on the property. [271 City
Councilmen Alan Taylor suggested that the project had teen refinanced under a
loophole in the contract. [281 Another suggestion offered to explain the
discrepancy in projected profit figures is that office space is rented to
Chase-affiliated organizations at "below-market" rates.[29] This project, said
Councilman Taylor, "should not be a model for public-private partnership." [301
The enormous complexity of drafting of commercial lease agreements
may have been a further source of confusion to the City of Hartford. Anticipating
problems and preventing potential conflicts between the parties to the agreement
require very fine drafting. Terms and concepts within the contract must be
precisely defined. For example, the lease agreement must determine whether the
rent schedule vill be based on a percentage of income. The total project costs must
be accurately defined to determine whether they include construction costs or
developer's overhead. If developer's overhead is included, the lease should specify
whether overhead will be calculated on a per unit or per project basis. Operating
and maintenance expenses must be defined and the extent to which these figures
are deducted from net cash flow must be determined. Unless the lease agreement is
carefully drated and thoughtfuly structured, a developer may be able to avoid the
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requirement of sharing profits by usin various creattive write-offs.
The city's task of monitoring very complex leasing g presents
officials with "an administrative nightmare." [311 Moreover.. Chase'. method of
operation has not been particularly helpf 1 to the city. The developer characterized
the city's monitoring of the lease agreement as roblem-free because Chase
"nundates" the city with quarterly financial statement.. audit. and o.ther rcd to
"educate" them about the development process. [321 However, according to a
Hartford attorney who has negotiated several leases with Chase, even a "Big-eight"
accounting firm would have difficulty in ascertaining whether the developer is
fully complying with the terms of the agreement. [33]
Although the City of Hartford has not yet had the opportunity to share
in the profits of the Stilts Building, city officials characterize the lease agreement
as mutually beneficial. Former city manager Voodrow Gaitor readily concedes that
when the lease for-the Stilts Building was negotiated, it was "a good deal" for the
city. The building was the first major downtown project in an area that, until then,
had seen very little development, and even fewer prospects for revitalization in the
future.[34] Public and private sector participants both receive benefits from their
participation. The developer receives a tax abatement and need not risk as much
up-front cash. The city gets a new office building and benefits from revitalization
of downtown. Hartford's Director of Development, Villiam Cochran, concluded that
by the end of the 20-year abatement period, the city would be collecting far more
than the amount of full taxes owed for the parcel.[35] Consequently, the lease for
the Stilts Building has been a model for several other development projects in and
outside of Hartford.
Across the street from the Stilts Building, a new office tower known as
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Commercial PlVa was developed by Chese with another similar lease agreement
from the city. The agreement assesses minimum rental payments in exchange for a
20-year tax abatement. One interesting dilemm-:a not contemplated at the time the
lease vas written concerns the sale to a tenant of the top three floors of the office
b:uilding. The transaction was chara terizecd t:y Chase as a 99-year prIp.d lease
and not as a sale for which the developer would be obliged to share with the
50% of the proceeds. Because of the agreement's ambiguous language, the City of
Hartford was left with no legal recourse. [3.6]I This highlights the difficulty that
cities experience in drafting agreements that fully protect their interests.
Chase has recently taken his entrepreneurial spirit and the lessons
learned in Hartford to the City of New Haven. In conjunction with the developer
Olympia & York, Chase developed a proposal for a Government Center complex for
the City of New Haven. The $87.5 million development proposal calls for the
construction of 420..000 square feet of office space, erection of a new city hall
annex, and construction of parking. The City of New Haven will be leasing land for
development for 125 years and will also provide a 20-year tax abatement. The
developer has agreed to make minimum rental payments, in addition to a
percentage of the net cash flov during the 20-year abatement period.
The lease for New Haven Government Center is structured much like the
lease agreements between Chase and the City of Hartford, with one major exception.
In New Haven, the lease reserves for the developer the right to "buy-out" the tax
abatement, a right which Chase apparently sought during the early years of the tax
agreement for the Stilts Building in Hartford. This "buy-out" provision permits
cancellation of the tax abatement at the option of the developer, and for the
subsequent appraisal of full taxes for the property in the event the project is
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unusually successful. If the developer decides to cancel the abatement, a.
"transition impositions" rent is applicable. For the first five years, this rental would
t'e $1 million. [.37 1
Chase characterized this "buy-out" provision as "the best of both wo:'rlds
for the city end ourselves." The city, Chase reasons.. is primarily interested in taxes
and jot an iS not loolkin: at profit sharing per Se. "sometime eS ucMen measu re
the city's otbj ectives in dolars," explained the developer. [38] Indeed, attorneys who
are negotia.ting the lease on behalf of the City of New Haven egree that the focal
point of the agreement and the primary interest to the City of New Haven is the
construction of a new City Hall annex by the developer, Chase. [391
The construction of the Government Center project rests on several
forms of public support. First, the project is subsidized by a UDAG loan for
construction of the City Hall annex. The loan does not charge interest for the first
five years, and thereafter, the rate is 4 .5%. The loan is also subordinate to the
developer's project loans. The second form of public support is the 125-year lease of
land and the 20-year tax abatement. Lastly, the city has offered to construct an
underground road leading to the parking facility for the Government Center
complex.[40)
The lease for New Haven's Government Center is characterized by a tax
financing formula, a provision for buy-out of the tax abatement and a complex
formula for net cash flow participation. The lease calls for minimum rental
payments for the first ten years, and a fixed in-lieu of tax payment during the first
five years. The percentage pilot rent of 50% of "net available cash" is to be
determined by deducting from the gross revenue all expenses including debt
repayment deposits, minumum rents, UDAG payments, and operating deficit
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advances. A supplementary rent is also required by the lease providing the city a
share of profits upon sale of the property. In adiopting this provision of the lease,
the City of New Haven took a cue from the Hartford experience with the Chase
project at Commercial Plaza. The lease agreement for the Government Center
project chairacterizes the sale to tenants of units or floors of the office nompleX.e a
"Me.. ndOt 8s ;a prIId rental payrment for the duration of the lease. ifte
3ent of the net cash proceeds of such sales vould accrue to the City of New
Haven.[41 ]
The experience of Hartford highlights the difficulties of securing for a
city a share of the profits of a project that it assisted with subsidies and other aid.
Nonetheless.. Hartford's experience does not negate the effect of a city's
participation in profit sharing arrangements, nor does it diminish the importance
of a city's participation in downtown development. A city's decision tb encourage
and participate in a development project need not depend on a "bottom line"
assessment of losses and profits. Other criteria can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of a municipality's entrepreneurial activity. When the prospects for
return include enhanced job opportunities, new tax reveneues or a revitalizaed
commercial district, these criteria can also justify municipal participation in joint
development partnerships.
An analysis of the various projects discussed in this chapter
demonstrates that when municipalities participate in joint development ventures,
securing a share of project income is often not of primary or overriding
importance to the city. In Hartford, we saw how the city leased a site for office
construction in exchange for a share of the profits. During the first few years of
the project's operation, the income to the city did not yield the financial bonanza it
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enticipated. Even wyfhen the sale of several floors of a Hartford office buiiJing;r
offered the city, for the first time, en oportunity to share substantiallv in
preds. the city ves precluded from shering in the profits because of amtbiguities
in the lease. Nevertheless, even those who suggest the lease has not met the city's
expetations acnowledge that the financial incentives embotied in the goound
h o t benefits to the .:::it that i are diffcult to quantfy. The <:Ity'-S
viili ness to share de'ivelopment risks has, in the opinion of city officials.. effecteed
a boom in office construction in areas that had not previously experienced
significant construction activity.
In New Haven, as vell, the potential to share in the profits of publicly
subsidized development is a prime element of a lease nov being negotiated to
develop a Government Center/office complex. The existence in the lease of a
provision permitting the developer to "buy-out" the profit sharing requirement if
the city's share of earnings exceed the ordinary level of taxes appears to negate any
possibilty for the city to actally share in the profits. The implication is that the
city's annual return from the project will never exceed the ordinary level of taxes
for the property. However, the city will derive other public benefits. In addition to
a boost in the city's economy resulting from new office construction, the city will
benefit from the construction of a new City Hall annex which is highly desired by
the City of New Haven.
New Haven may not earn an attractive return on their investment but
their future interests are protected by a756 lease agreement which secures for
them a minimum recapture of the public subsidy. Furthermore, the contractual
protection offered by the lease is an important mechanism for controlling the form
and nature of development in the city. Moreover, the ground lease secures for the
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city a highly needed putbic"4- eaenity in the for m o0 a new City Hall annex. Finay11y
the lease p roid.es the city with a mninim um financial return which iS far more then
the cities of' Yon1Cers adi Detroit obtained when they offee inctielt to local
industry.




Cities need not be Copelled to balance their investment , in rivte
development against the potential financial yield that a project may return. In
Yonkers and in Detroit, city officials may have been negligent in failing to secure
for the city a formally binding agreement in exchange for the city's good faith
investment in local industry. Nevertheless, after assessing the city's options,
officials of both Detroit and Yonkers concluded that they had to provide such
subsidies or risk unacceptably high economic losses.
The offer of subsidies by Detroit and Yonkers without any formal
binding commitment suggests that the private investor has greater bargaining
power than the city since the company can simply "pack its bags" and leave town.
The experience of Yonkers and Detroit also suggests that the offer of lucrative
development incentives by one city can encourage competing municipalities to.
follow suit.
&ne a loamiity. doe,0 graInt ad on2 ';-Z T.:e-a& w" erma-.
other lomay-' feey l w.i gaed to f rolw' its Mpad in
order to preseT.rve thieir industrial job bases. Not 1 Only
do axpayrers swfer. kut &!! a he firms that had 1ocated i.f-
in the jurisdicaot2 earlier risk ha&Tvingj to compete?
with n1 .2er.Pwomers whot-rse rnste av.i te
In the final arvalysis, a company that is subsidized, as G.M. was in Detroit, will
benefit from the subsidy, as would the city who maintains the industry. However,
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the benefits to Detroit may be gained at the cost of economic efficiency.
The use of subsidies to inspire development could be characterized as a
transfer of development costs from the developer to the taxpayer. In aVIl Street
Journal editorial criticizing the UDAG program.. the journai maintdIned that:
Economic inefficiency may be resolved by greater collusion and cooperation 6mong
the cities. However, unless federal urban policy effectively discourages the
extension of subsidies except when absolutely necessary. individual municipalities
may remain at a competitive disadvantage. To overcome that disadvantage,
municipalities may need to secure a minimum return on their development
subsidies through recapture provisions.
Municipal efforts to obtain a share in the income of a project may be
characterized as the recapture of the value of a public subsidy. "Value capture" is a
policy term used to connote public efforti to defray the outlay of public funds by
capturing the value of public investment which traditionally accrues to private
interests. [31 This theory is comparable to the late Donald Hagman's proposals
known as "windfalls for wipeouts." Hagman suggested schemes for compensating
people whose land is injured by governmental activity, and to recoup for the public
some portion of the increased lend values resulting from public actions. [41 The
roots of value capture policy lie in the policy area of urban mass transit
development. Publicly funded development, such as urban rapid transit systems,
has resulted in the accrual of value, and, in some cases, a windfall to private
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landow7-ners. The value of public investments has been recapv-tured throi. the use
of excess condemnation. special tenefit essenssmentd specI taxs
and air rights development. Moreover, it h.as enabled the public authority charged
ith mass transit development "to reap the fruit of their own efforts." Repturing
the excess value created by the vast expenditure o f pu:'btlic funds has permitted the
go vernn gnc tore thI ,-- e p -ublic financing-no, and1 alilwis muiiplti !tobdjwi -:ency torz oC~h m L
perpetually capable io t enhancing downtw development. [5 1
Lessons tor recapturing the value of public subsidies can be taken from
other contexts, as well. For instance, in terms of health care the federal
government requires private hospitals to provide a minimum level of free services
if their construction ras subsidized by federal grants. The federal Hill-Burton Act
requires that recipients of federal grants for the construction of hospital and
health care facilities provide "a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to
pay therefor." [6] Hospitals who receive Hill-Burton funding must malke free
services available at a level not less than 3% of operating costs; or equal to 10% of all
federal assistance provided. [7] The requirement that free services be made
available remains in effect for not more than 20 years after completion of
construction of the hospital facility or beyond the period that the loan remains
unpaid. [81
A similar statutory requirement could be imposed on developers of
publicly-subsidized projects. Under appropriate circumstances, developers could be
essessed a percentage of their earnings, as an exaction to support some public good
or service. This is already happening in the cities of Boston and San Francisco
where "linkage" programs impose upon developers of downtown office buildings an
exaction of funding to support construction of lov and moderate income housing
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within the city. [91 S'uch evidence supports the contention that value cature
policies may be implemented in joint ventures between public and private p'arties
so that both municipality and developer can benefit from government inspired
development.
The recapture of municipal development subsidies and the :liocation of
projc(:t earings Lmn g b pli and pivat sc5tfr pticipents. may e:::trag
diTional develop- meni prje, even when effiorts to har e profits are of limited
flnancial sucess. That explains why the Hertford experience with profit sharing..
although beset with disappointments and misunderstandings, has still been the
model for other joint development projects in Hartford, and in New Haven as vell.
Furthermore, New Haven's ability to direct development in the interests of the city
is another example of the benefits of a municipality's entrepreneurial activity.
Ultimately, the capacity for both government participant and private developer to
derive mutual benefit vill contribute to the more videspread use of ris: shering
and profit sharing as tools for inspiring economic development.
The UDAG program offers an illustration of value capture
techniques.[10 The recapture of UDAG funds is important because it can facilitate a
movement towards local self-sufficiency. In view of declining federal aid,
resistance to higher taxes, and the high cost of bond issues, the recycling of public
development funds may be the only way for cities to assure themselves of future
revenue for housing, community and economic development activities. [111 The
UDAG program uses several mechanisms to recapture public funds used to subsidize
development: (1) land disposition, which allows for the sale of publicly-owned land;
(2) lease agreements, which provide that a share of the net proceeds or a share of
the income, cash flow or rents of a private development project go to the
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municipality; aid (3) net cash flow~r and equity participation which permit a. city to
share net cash flow after the developer receives a. speifid r'eturn. r121 In 1980,
62% of UDAG projects included such provisions for recapture. [13 Together, these
mechanisms help to ensure that municipalities share in the value generated by
pulcinvestments
Inditi. on to providin 1o7' interst loens. UDAG grents also upport
city-constructed public improvem ents, transportation-related improvements and
funds for acquisition, preparation and clearance of sites. Awards of UDAG grants by
the federal Department of Housing anid Urban Development are based on
competitive, discretionary criteria that consider:
the leveraging ratio of private dollars to public dollars (a
minimum of $2.5 private dollars for each public doller
invested);
- job generation (a minimum of 1 new job to every $10,000
granted is expected);
- anticipated increases in tax revenue;
- the city's past performance in housing and commuinity
develoment;
- the impact of the project on the city's physical and economic
condition;
- timely completion of project;
- extent of commercial and residential relocation required; and
- the city's ranking on HUD's list of distressed cities. [14]
Participation in the UDAG program requires legally binding commitment letters
from the developer and the approval of contracts between the city and
participating private parties. Each grant is negotiated individually. Developers are
usually expected to guarantee project completion and offer a personal guarantee to
repay the loan, as vell. Interim financing commitments must be secured and
letters of commitment from conventional lenders must be obtained. Interest
payments during the early years of a project are normally forgiven, but once the
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project is operational, the developer is expected to share a percentage of the income
with the municipality. UDAG fuands have been used for direct incentvies such as
telowi mark:et rate loans for rehabilitaTion. interest subsidies.. land value
write-do wns and on-site improvements.
Municipalities who sponsor UDAG supported jtoben e 'K ,f:it f!rom tlh
d velop rs p y bc.ft ef d r l s b i yt the lo li . A t ou h he r ov r
of this sutsidy does not constitute a share of roject p-'rofit'S. the -back is a
discrete financial benefit and ean arguably be characterized as a form of profit.
[15] Indeed, the UDAG program was not designed for the purpose of providing
"one-time development expenditures"; UDAG funding is meant to be an "investment"
enabling municipalities to recapture and recycle funds for future development
projects. [161
Tax abatements are generally discouraged by UDAG officials "unless the
city soutely convinces us that in * given cse it's the only ay to make a deal
work." [171 This comment, from David Cordish, the Director of the UDAG Office at the
time of the program's inception during the Carter administration, belies the
widespread use tax abatements for development, even among UDAG funded projects.
One out of every four UDAG projects is supported by tax abatements,[18] despite
efforts by HUD officials to discourage their use. Thus, the projected increases in
local public finance may not be accurate indicators of the return to the
municipality. Each UDAG dollar is expected to secure an additional 16 cents in tax
revenues on an annual basis. [19] When lucrative tax abatements are given these
projects, municipalities may not even experience any net local tax gains. [201 This
is particularly true in the case of Detroit's assistance in the development of the new
G.M. facility in Poletown. That project makes use of a $30 million subsidy, the
Chapter Four
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iergest federal grant ever averded a single development project until then. The
City of Detroit also provided G.M. with a 50%o tax at.atement. monsequently.. any
mu1.nicip.alities who participate in UDAG-funded -projects may not Le experiencing
any net tax gains ior m any years to come.
HUD officiels have been urging localities to inc.lude "icer" orovisions
to inc.rse thc te feturn on invesment. The "Ric"rovision when
inc~:orporated in the development agreement.. provides the city with a share of the
project income based on a percentage of earnings when the development becomes
operational. Susan Clarke reports that many cities are reluctant to include "kicker"
provisions in UDAG agreements for fear of "jeopardizing private sector
participation." (21] Although statistics are not available on the extent to which
"kicker" provisions are a part of UDAG agreements, Clarke reports that HUD's
brokerage role has helped encourage the sharing of profits and net cash proceeds.
[221 As a consequence of prodding by federal UDAG program administrators,
municipalities' behavior and perceptions about their role in the development
process may have begun to change. In some measure due to the UDAG program,
cities are learning to become more sophisticated in their negotiation of
development agreements, and more entrepreneuerial in their pursuit of a share of
project income.
Many of the more innovative profit sharing agreements between
localities and developers were made possible because of the UDAG program which
extends public subsidies to developers when capital financing is other9ise
unavailable. Required by law to be the lowest amount necessary to make the project
feasible, UDAG subsidies are granted to projects that demonstrate a capacity to
leverage private investment, and a potential for increasing tax revenues and
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generating new jot:b opportunities. The UDAG program is structured on the premise
that a developer should gTet ;a faBir return on its investment, not a windfll. 23 1
One development project which seems to have incorporated the
principles embodied in the UDAG program is the Syracuse University hotel and
conference center. The center.. ointly developed by the university and the City of
Syracuse.. offers en unusu7 illustratio of a proiect that involves. a direct
investment in dievelopment by the city. The conference center provides for a
unique form of public financing. It is a "one-of-a-kind" condominium investment
hotel in which the city bought the first 29 rooms with a $3.8 million UDAG sutsid.
Other private investors are buying the hotel's remaining two hundred rooms.
individually, and in condominium ftshion.
"I his ' first &n- foremost -a t''usiness a i estmen "
sa.y David ich;ael. the ciy ' commissioner of
ec12omic deTveVpme2t. "ProspectiT owers r-111 be
look.ing at1 "ax heter.". dpeito orportunitiex.
a.n'd resale values. " . . . The &otel managemen [to be a
franchise. operation under Sheraton Inns.. Inc.] will
book the Taca2t rooms in tt cWusMtory 2ot"e fasioi
an d will pool 4l income. The2 Shares o
profiIs from th hotei operatons Will g o our
Iuarterly7 to all in dividuai c'nOminium twners. The
ciy. becae the SyT.racuse Aconomik Dev'elopment
Vorporation ows those first 29 urnits. r.il share in
th2e profits of the howe opertns. as itell als rhosefrom the e Tetual resales of the indii T1dual rooms.l[24
However, the likely accrual of profits inherent in the project will not evolve at the
expense of other public needs. The development of a conference center by the City
of Syracuse brings public benefits to the city end is not strictly a "business
investment" as it was characterized by the City Development Commisisoner. Indeed.
the competitive, discretionary criteria of the UDAG program would not permit the
award of a subsidy to be used as a mere business investment by the city. In addition
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to a share of the prcfits.. Syracuse will derive ecctnoimic cEnefits which include the
creation of 300 new jot-s.. construction of the city's first hotel/conferencect
-an an aticip.ated increase i n the city's tax revenues. 25i
The federal UDAG program seeks to encourage entrepreneurial activity
of the dnd initiated by the City of Syracuse. Several elements of the UDAG program
mak.:e this policy ot:j ective p:ossible. First of all. the± UDAG~ prog~ram~ r'equires
maximum lever'agi4ng of private dollars agi nst putlic Subsidies. Secondly.
development subsidies are awarded only to projects which would likely generate
new jobs and new tax revenues. Furthermore, the avrerd of subsidies is usually
conditioned on a pay-back of the subsidy, thus effecting a recapture of public
investment. Recapture of the public subsidy allows additional municipal
investment in development and reinforces the city's entrepreneurial role.
Vithout the strong guidance of federal policy directives, however.. cities
'vould not likely pursue a direct return on publicly subsidized development. The
competition among municipalities across the country to extend subsidies and
incentives to attract development puts individual cities at a competitive
disadvantage. In the absence of collusion and cooperation among the cities, only a
uniform national policy could encourage municipalities to demand a .minimal
recapture of public subsidies. Vithout minimum guidelines which dictate
municipal development policy, some cities may continue to undercut their o':wn
financial interests, as may have happened in Yonkers and Detroit, in their zeal to
attract and maintain downtown development. Furthermore, urban development
guidelines must originate at the national rather than the local or state level because
the federal government remains the most important source of public subsidies for
downtown development. Accordingly, it is the most logical and most effective
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source of regulation. State go'vernment could also initiate such municirpel
development policy, tut only uniform national guidelines would li:ely eliminate
the competitive negotiating e of munici.8Aities who are ot similarly regltI
t.e guidelines. The choacteristics of:m effective municpa development
policy would require further en.d more extensive study.
The a ilure municipalities tco Aeur a r of priLj.:::t rfits e
reversed ty implementation of a national urtbn development policy that requires
city officials to recapture the value of putic development subsidies. Onlvy strong
uniform federal guidelines can strengthen the city's hand in negotiating joint
development agreements and offer the assurance that municipal officials in
Yonkers, Detroit and Hartford will secure a greater and more direct return on the
city's publicly subsidized development.
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